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Abstract. In this paper, we address the selfish bin covering problem,
which is greatly related both to the bin covering problem, and to the
weighted majority game. What we mainly concern is how much the lack
of coordination harms the social welfare. Besides the standard PoA and
PoS, which are based on Nash equilibrium, we also take into account
the strong Nash equilibrium, and several other new equilibria. For each
equilibrium, the corresponding PoA and PoS are given, and the problems
of computing an arbitrary equilibrium, as well as approximating the best
one, are also considered.
Keywords: Selfish bin covering, weighted majority games, price of an-
archy, price of stability, Nash equilibrium.
1 Introduction
The bin covering problem, which is also called the dual bin packing problem,
since it has some kind of dual relation with the famous bin packing problem,
has n + 1 positive integers, a1, a2, · · · , an, b, as its input, where aj (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
is the size of item j and b the volume of bins. We assume that aj < b for all
1 ≤ j ≤ n and there are sufficiently many bins. The problem is to allocate the
items into bins such that the number of covered bins is maximized, where a bin
is called covered if the total size of items allocated to it is equal to or greater
than b. Alternatively, the problem can be seen as to partition the n items such
that the number of subsets in the partition whose total size is not less than b is
maximized.
An implicit assumption in the bin covering problem is the existence of a
central decision maker, who has absolute control of all the items, and aims to
maximize the social welfare, i.e. the number of covered bins (we can imagine it
like this: for each covered bin, a profit of 1 is gained by the society). This kind
of centralized system is often encountered in the real world, and has its own
advantages, say, efficiency. At the same time, centralized systems are usually
hard to realize and really fragile. There is also an opposite kind of system,
the decentralized system, where the central decision maker disappears, and is
⋆ The research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China
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replaced by a set of agents, each of which controls a single item and makes
its own decision to maximize its own profit. Compared with the centralized
system, a decentralized system is usually easier to realize and more robust. Due
to these advantages, decentralized systems are drawing more and more attention
of researchers in artificial intelligence, control theory, mechanism design and
theoretical computer science.
The biggest disadvantage of decentralized systems, however, is that in most
cases, the lack of a central decision maker will harm the social welfare, that
is, it is usually inefficient. Our question is, how inefficient? If the inefficiency is
relatively small, then this is no big deal. So an immediate question is, how to
quantify the inefficiency? Fortunately, armed with game theory, researchers find
a satisfactory measure: price of anarchy (PoA). Game theory studies the settings
where all the players are self-interested, and takes equilibria as the outcomes that
may happen. Since equilibria are usually not unique, PoA is intuitively defined
as the ratio between the worst social welfare we may get among all the equilibria
in the decentralized system, and that in the centralized system (i.e. the optimal
social welfare). The analysis of PoA, as well as PoS (price of stability, which is the
ratio between the best social welfare we may get among all the equilibria and the
optimal social welfare), for various decentralized systems, forms an important
part of the booming algorithmic game theory ([24]).
We refer to the decentralized bin covering problem as the selfish bin covering
problem (SBC for short). Before giving the formal definitions of PoA and PoS for
SBC, there are still three questions we have to answer: 1. What are the payoff
functions of agents? 2. How to define the social welfare? 3. How to define an
equilibrium?
For the first question, we take the natural and frequently used proportional
rule, that is, in any covered bin, the payoff allocated to any member is its size
divided by the the total size of items allocated to that bin. For the second,
we take the popular utilitarian welfare function, i.e. the sum of all the agents’
payoff, which is exactly the number of covered bins. For the last, we take the
famous (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE for short), (pure) strong Nash equilibrium
(SNE), and four newly defined ones: fireable Nash equilibria type (I) (FNE(I)),
fireable Nash equilibria type (II) (FNE(II)), fireable Nash equilibria type (III)
(FNE(III)), and modified strong Nash equilibrium (M-SNE), whose exact defi-
nitions will be given in the later corresponding sections, respectively.
Formally, let SBC be the set of all the selfish bin covering problems, OPT (G)
the optimal social welfare of G ∈ SBC, NE(G) the set of NEs of G, and p(π)
the social profit of π ∈ NE(G), then PoA and PoS for SBC w.r.t. NE are defined
as follows:
PoANE(SBC) = inf
G
min
pi∈NE(G)
p(π)
OPT (G)
,
PoSNE(SBC) = inf
G
max
pi∈NE(G)
p(π)
OPT (G)
.
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Analogous to PoANE and PoSNE , we can define the other PoAs and PoSs.
What we need to do is simply replace NE in the above two formulas with SNE
etc., respectively. In the rest of this paper, the parameter SBC in various PoAs
and PoSs will be omitted.
For each equilibrium, we also concern the problems of computing an arbitrary
equilibrium, as well as approximating the best one (which is NP-hard to find).
Our results are listed in the following table, where complexity stands for the
complexity of finding an arbitrary equilibrium, and AFPTAS (Asymptotic Fully
Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme) means that AFPTAS exists, that is,
for arbitrary positive small ǫ, there is an algorithm which outputs an equilibrium
whose social welfare is at least 1−ǫ times the optimal one when the optimal social
welfare is large enough, and the running time can be bounded by a polynomial
both in n and 1/ǫ.
Table 1. Main Results
Equilibria PoA PoS Complexity Approximability
NE 0 1 O(1) AFPTAS
FNE(I) 0.5 1 O(n2) AFPTAS
FNE(II) 0.5 1 NP-hard NP-hard
FNE(III) 0.5 1 NP-hard NP-hard
M-SNE 0.5 1 NP-hard NP-hard
SNE 0.5 0.5 NP-hard NP-hard
2 Related work
The bin covering problem is first studied by Assman in his thesis ([1]) and
then in the journal paper of Assmann et al. ([2]). It is very easy to show that
the bin covering problem is NP-hard, and we are not able to approximate it
with a worst case performance ratio better than 0.5, unless P=NP ([1]). It is
still not hard to show that the next-fit algorithm has a worst case performance
ratio of exactly 0.5 ([2]). Analogous to the bin packing problem, what we are
interested is how the bin covering problem can be asymptoticly approximated.
To put it precisely, given any instance I, let A(I) be the number of bins covered
by algorithm A, and OPT (I) be the optimal value. The asymptotic worst case
ratio of algorithm A is defined as
RA
∞
= lim inf
OPT (I)→∞
A(I)
OPT (I)
.
One central topic for the bin covering problem is to find a polynomial time
algorithm with an asymptotic worst case ratio as large as possible.
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Low-order polynomial time algorithms with RA
∞
= 2/3 and 3/4 are explored
by Assmann ([1]), Assmann et al. ([2]) and Csirik et al. ([8]). Csirik et al. ([9])
give the first APTAS (Asymptotic Polynomial Time Approximation Schemes),
Jansen and Solis-Oba ([19]) derive an AFPTAS. For the analysis of average case
performance, there are also several results ([7], [9]). Woeginger and Zhang ([26])
also consider the variant with variable-sized bins.
The weighted majority game (WMG for short), which is a classic model
in coalitional (cooperative) game theory and has rich applications in politics, is
greatly related with the selfish bin covering problem, so we give a sketch of it.
An instance of WMG is usually represented by G = (q; a1, a2, · · · , an), where q is
called the quota and aj the weight of player j. q is usually required to be bigger
than half of the total weight, and this is the only difference between WMG and
SBC.
The characteristic function is defined as: v(C) = 1 iff
∑
j∈C aj ≥ q; v(C) = 0
otherwise. An interesting phenomenon in WMG is that the bargaining powers of
players usually are not proportional to their weights. For a simple example, there
are 3 players in total, their weights are 3, 4, 5, respectively, and the quota is 7,
then all the three players have the same bargaining power! So a central topic in
WMG is how to measure the bargaining powers of the players. There are mainly
four recognized ways: the Shapley-Shubic index ([25]), the Banzhaf index ([3]),
the Holler-Packel index ([16,17]), and the Deegen-Packel index ([11]).
Matsui and Matsui ([21,22]) prove that all the problems of computing the
Shapley-Shubik indices, the Banzhaf indices and the Deegan-Packel indices in
WMGs are NP-hard, and there are pseudo-polynomial time dynamic program-
ming algorithms for them. Cao and Yang ([10]) show that computing the Holler-
Packel index is also NP-hard. Deng and Papadimitriou ([12]) prove that it is
#P-complete to compute the Shapley-Shubik index. Matsui and Matsui ([22])
observe that Deng and Papadimitriou’s proof can be easily carried over to the
problem of computing the Banzhaf index.
Back to SBC, though the proportional way of payoff allocating in our paper
may not be absolutely fair, the proportion does roughly measure the contribution
that an agent makes to the coalition. What’s more, this way prevails in the real
world, and its being trivial to calculate, compared with the NP-hardness of the
more delicate ways , is really an advantage to our analysis.
Coalition formation games, which studies which coalition structures (i.e.
partitions of players) are the most likely to form, is a relatively new branch
in coalitional game theory. We can safely classify SBC into coalition formation
games. In coalition formation games, stable coalition structures are treated as the
ones to form. Since the concept of stability is just another word for equilibrium,
which we discussed in the last section, briefly introducing several closely related
stabilities that have already been used in coalition formation games will be
helpful.
Nash stability, i.e. NE that we mentioned in the last section, requires that no
player will benefit if he leaves the original coalition to which he belongs and joins
a new one. In this concept, there is no restriction for the players’ migrations. To
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require that any player’s migrations into a coalition should not harm the original
members gives the concept of individual stability (IE for short). To further require
that any player’s migration should not harm members of the original coalition
to which he belongs gives contractually individual stability (CIE for short). It’s
obvious that NE implies IE, and IE further implies CIE (for more knowledge,
please refer [5]). Since we will show that PoANE = 0 and PoSNE = 1, the latter
two concepts will be omitted in our discussion.
Selfish bin packing (SBP for short), which combines the idea of decen-
tralization into the classic bin packing problem, has a great analogy to SBC.
In SBP, there are also n items, each of which has a size and is controlled by
a selfish agent, and sufficiently many bins with identical capacities b. The dif-
ference is that the total size of items that are packed into a bin should not
exceed b, and every nonempty bin incurs a cost of 1, which is shared among
its members proportional to their sizes. This model is introduced by Bilo` ([4]).
The exact PoANE is still unknown up to now, and the current best lower bound
and upper bound are 1.6416 (by Epstein and Kleiman ([13]), Yu and Zhang
([27]), independently) and 1.6428 (by Epstein and Kleiman ([13])), respectively,
with a narrow gap to cover. Epstein and Kleiman also show that PoSNE = 1,
and 1.6067 ≤ PoASNE = PoSSNE ≤ 1.6210. Yu and Zhang also show that
computing an NE can be done in O(n4) time.
3 Notations and preliminaries
We denote byN the set of agents, i.e.N = {1, 2, · · · , n}. Let π = {B1, B2, · · · , Bm}
be a partition of N , that is ∪mi=1Bi = N , and Bi ∩Bj = ∅ for all 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m.
We don’t distinguish between a bin and the subset of agents in this bin, if no
confusion is incurred. For any subset Bi of N , s(Bi) is the total size of the mem-
bers in Bi, i.e. s(Bi) =
∑
j∈Bi
aj . A partition π is called reasonable if there is at
most one Bi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) such that s(Bi) < b.
We use Bj,pi to denote the member in π to which agent j belongs. Let p(π)
be the social welfare of π, i.e. the number of covered bins in π, p(j, π) be the
payoff allocated to agent j in π, then p(j, π) = aj/s(Bj,pi) if s(Bj,pi) ≥ b, and
p(j, π) = 0 if s(Bj,pi) < b. For any Bi ∈ π, let amin(Bi) = min{aj : j ∈ Bi}. A
bin Bi is called minimal covered if it is covered and the removal of any of its
member causes it uncovered, i.e. b ≤ s(Bi) < b + amin(Bi), and exactly covered
if s(Bi) = b. π is called rational if it is reasonable and all the covered bins are
minimal covered.
The partition problem ([15]), which may be the easiest NP-hard problem, is
frequently used in the proving of weakly NP-hardness. It is described as follows:
given a set of positive integers e1, e2, · · · , en, can we partition these integers into
two subsets, such that each of them has exactly a half of the total size? i.e. is
there a set C ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n} such that
∑
j∈C ej =
∑
j /∈C ej?
The subset sum problem ([15]), which will be used later, is also a classic
problem. Given a set of positive integers e1, e2, · · · , en and an integer s, the
problem asks if there exists a subset which sums to s. Subset sum is NP-hard, and
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admits a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm with time complexity O(n
∑n
j=1 ej).
Subset sum can be seen as a special case of the knapsack problem, which is
known to be linearly solvable if the capacity of the knapsack is a constant ([23]).
Therefore, if s is constant, subset sum is also linearly solvable.
FFD (First Fit Decreasing, [18]), which is a well known heuristic for the bin
packing problem, has an analogue in the bin covering problem. We still denote
the analogue as FFD. It first sorts the items in non-increasing order of their
sizes, then puts the items one by one in this order to a bin until the bin is covered,
and opens a new bin to repeat the above action if there are still unpacked items.
Due to the non-increasing order, we can easily see that bins derived by FFD
are all minimal covered, except possibly the last uncovered one.
LPT (Largest Processing Time, [14]), which is a well known heuristic for
the parallel machine scheduling problem P ||Cmax, will also be used later. LPT
first sorts all the jobs in non-increasing order of their processing times, and then
allocate the jobs one by one in this order to a least loaded machine. In SBC,
the size of an item can be naturally seen as the processing time, and bins can
be seen as machines. In the next section, we will use LPT partially. That is, a
subset of items have already been allocated to bins, and LPT is used to allocate
the remaining items to the already opened bins.
4 Nash equilibrium
According to the definition, a reasonable partition π = {B1, B2, · · · , Bm} is an
NE iff p(j, π(j, Bi)) ≤ p(j, π) for all j ∈ N and for all Bi such that j /∈ Bi, where
π(j, Bi) is a partition of N derived by moving j to Bi. NE always exist, since it
is trivial to see that {N} ∈ NE. Remember that we assume aj < b for all j ∈ N .
And therefore PoANE = 0.
From any reasonable partition π = {B1, B2, · · · , Bm}, we show that it is easy
to derive an NE, without decreasing the social welfare. Suppose that the unique
uncovered bin in π is Bm.
Algorithm FFD-LPT
STEP 1. Input the reasonable partition π = {B1, B2, · · · , Bm};
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1
while (Bi is not minimal covered)
{take out the smallest remaining item;}
endfor
STEP 2. Run FFD on the taking out items and the items in Bm;
/*Without loss of generality, we assume there are still m− 1 covered
bins in total, and the unique uncovered bin is Bm.*/
STEP 3. while (max{aj : j ∈ Bm} > min{aj : j ∈ ∪
m−1
i=1 Bi})
{exchange the biggest item in Bm with the smallest one in
∪m−1i=1 Bi;
/*Suppose Bk is the bin which consists of the smallest item in ∪
m−1
i=1 Bi
before the exchange.*/
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while (Bk is not minimal covered)
{take out the smallest remaining item;}
Run FFD on the taking out items and items in Bm.}
STEP 4. Call LPT to allocate the items of Bm into B1, B2, · · · , Bm−1.
Lemma 1. For any reasonable partition π, FFD-LPT gives an NE in O(n2)
time, without decreasing the social welfare.
Proof. Let π′ be the final partition. It is trivial that p(π′) ≥ p(π). Without loss
of generality, we suppose π′ = {B′1, B
′
2, · · · , B
′
m−1}. To verify that π
′ ∈ NE, it
suffices to show that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, the smallest agent in B′i is satisfied
with its position.
We denote the partition at the end of Step 3 still as π = {B1, B2, · · · , Bm},
and have the next three observations: (a) each item in ∪m−1i=1 Bi is not bigger than
any one in Bm; (b) each Bi (1 ≤ i ≤ m−1) is minimal covered; (c) every agent in
∪m−1i=1 Bi is satisfied with its position in the partial partition {B1, B2, · · · , Bm−1}.
(a) is just an interpretation of the stopping condition of Step 4, (b) is due to
FFD, and (c) comes directly form (b).
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and j ∈ B′i ∈ π
′ with aj = amin(B
′
i), we discuss in two
cases. Case 1. j is in Bm at the end of Step 3. Due to LPT , Bi has the smallest
total size before the joining of j, and therefore j is temporarily satisfied with its
position. aj = amin(Bi) tells us that j is the last member of Bi. After the joining
of j, the total size of Bi keeps unchanged, while the total sizes of the other bins
do not decrease, so j is satisfied with its position in the final partition π′. Case
2. j is in Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, at the end of Step 3. Due to observation (a), there
is no member joining Bi in Step 4. Since agent j is satisfied at the end of Step
3 (observation (c)), it is satisfied in the final partition π′.
Step 1 and Step 2 can be done in O(n logn) time. Since no exchanged item in
Bm comes back, the outer while loop in Step 3 is executed for at most n times.
And it is easy to see that each loop can be done in O(n) time. So the total time
for Step 3 is O(n2). Step 4 can be easily done in O(n logn) time. In sum, the
total running time is O(n2). ⊓⊔
Theorem 1. (a) PoANE = 0, PoSNE = 1;
(b) There exists an AFPTAS for approximating the best NE.
Proof. Since there is always an optimal partition that is reasonable, we immedi-
ate have (a) from Lemma 1. For any partition derived by the AFPTAS for the
bin covering problem ([19]), we can also give a corresponding NE by FFD-LPT
without decreasing the social welfare, so (b) is valid. ⊓⊔
5 Fireable Nash equilibria
Let π = (B1, B2, · · · , Bm) be a reasonable partition, and Bm the unique uncov-
ered bin, we define three fireable Nash equilibria. The same idea in these equi-
libria is that, every covered bin should be minimal covered. This idea is quite
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natural, since any non-minimal covered bin is redundant, firing certain agent or
agents will make it minimal covered, and the other agents have incentive to do
this unanimously because they will all become strictly better off.
The differences lie in how to constrain the migrations of agents. Recall that
in NE, there is no constraint for the agents’ migrations: as long as an agent can
benefit from doing so, it is allowed to do it; in IE, the migration of an agent
should not harm its new partners; and in CIE, neither should the migration
harm its new partners nor should it harm the old colleagues.
5.1 Definitions
Definition 1. π ∈ FNE(I) iff:
(1) π is rational.
(2) There exists no item j ∈ ∪m−1i=1 Bi such that (a) Bm ∪ {j} is minimal
covered, and (b) s(Bm) + aj < s(Bj,pi).
In FNE(I), we require that migration of any agent from a minimal covered bin
into the uncovered bin Bm be not allowed, if it causes Bm non-minimal covered,
even if this migration is applauded by the migrating agent (and of course by the
members in Bm).
Definition 2. π ∈ FNE(II) iff:
(1) π is rational.
(2) There exists no item j ∈ ∪m−1i=1 Bi and a subset E of Bm such that (a)
(Bm \ E) ∪ {j} is minimal covered, and (b) s(Bm \ E) + aj < s(Bj,pi).
In FNE(II), the migration that we remarked for FNE(I) is allowed. And the
migrating agent is actually farsighted: if it will benefit from the migration only
after the firing of some subset of the original members, which it anticipates will
happen, then it will do it. Note that the migration of any agent, either from
a minimal covered bin or from the uncovered bin, into a minimal covered bin,
is not allowed, even if the migrating agent anticipates that this will benefit it
eventually. Further allowing this kind of migration gives FNE(III).
Definition 3. π ∈ FNE(III) iff:
(1) π is rational.
(2) There exists no item j ∈ N , a bin Bi (1 ≤ i ≤ m,Bi 6= Bj,pi) and a subset
E of Bi such that (a) (Bi \E)∪{j} is minimal covered, and (b) s(Bi \E)+aj <
min{δ(Bi), δ(Bj,pi)}, where δ(B) = s(B) if s(B) ≥ b, and δ(B) = +∞ otherwise,
for any B ⊆ N .
In the above definition, it is easy to check that (b) means if the new bin
(Bi \E)∪{j} forms, then all its members will be strictly better off than in π. It
is also easy to see that FNE(III) implies FNE(II), which further implies FNE(I),
since the constraints for agents’ migrations are the most in FNE(I), and are the
least in FNE(III).
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5.2 The potential function
We define a potential function which will be used in the next subsection and Sec-
tion 7. Unlike the ordinary single valued potential function, our potential func-
tion is vector valued. Let P (·) be the potential function, and π = (B1, B2, · · · , Bm)
is a reasonable partition, and Bm the unique uncovered bin, then
P (π) = (s(B′1), s(B
′
2), · · · , s(B
′
m−1)),
where {B′1, B
′
2, · · · , B
′
m−1} = {B1, B2, · · · , Bm−1} and s(B
′
1) ≤ s(B
′
2) ≤ · · · ≤
s(B′m−1).
For any two vectors v = (v1, v2, · · · , vs), w = (w1, w2, · · · , wt), we say that v
is lexicographically smaller than w, which is denoted by v ≺ w, iff there exists
an integer j0, 1 ≤ j0 ≤ min{s, t}, such that vj0 < wj0 , and ∀j < j0, vj = wj .
Accordingly, we can define an order ≺ between reasonable partitions. Let
π1, π2 be two reasonable partitions, we say that π1 ≺ π2 iff P (π1) ≺ P (π2). It’s
easy to check that this is a strictly partial order, that is, it satisfies ir-reflexivity
(¬(π ≺ π)), asymmetry (π1 ≺ π2 ⇒ ¬(π2 ≺ π1)) and transitivity (π1 ≺ π2 and
π2 ≺ π3 ⇒ π1 ≺ π3).
In the setting of FNE(I), where the migration can only occur from a cov-
ered bin to the uncovered one, the natural best response dynamics, in which
an arbitrary unsatisfied agent moves to the uncovered bin unless the partition
is already an equilibrium, always lead to an equilibrium, since each migration
makes the previous partition smaller in the sense of ≺, and the number of reason-
able partitions is finite for any fixed instance of SBC. Due to this argument, we
get immediately that FNE(I) exists. Our next question is, is the best-response-
dynamics algorithm polynomial? The answer is YES.
5.3 Main results
The basic ideas for the next two lemmas are from G. Yu and G. Zhang([27]).
Starting from a rational partition π = (B1, B2, · · · , Bm), where s(B1) ≥ s(B2) ≥
· · · ≥ s(Bm), and Bm is the unique uncovered bin, suppose the best-response-
dynamics algorithm has K migrations before it ends. Let the partition after the
t-th (1 ≤ t ≤ K) migration be πt = (Bt1, B
t
2, · · · , B
t
m), and suppose that these
bins have been re-indexed such that s(Bt1) ≥ s(B
t
2) ≥ · · · ≥ s(B
t
m). Then:
Lemma 2. s(Bm) < s(B
1
m) < s(B
2
m) < · · · < s(B
K
m), and s(Bj) ≥ s(B
1
j ) ≥
s(B2j ) ≥ · · · ≥ s(B
K
j ) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1.
Proof. Since in any step the minimal covered bin to which the migrating agent
belongs becomes the next unique uncovered bin, the first part of the lemma is
trivial. Because the total size of the new minimal covered bin is not smaller than
the one to which the migrating agent originally belongs, the second part is also
easy. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. Suppose agent i ∈ N migrates ti times in the best-response-dynamics
algorithm, then ti ≤ m− 1. And hence K ≤ n(m− 1).
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Proof. Suppose the bin that agent i moves in for the j-th time ranks rj in the
derived partition, 1 ≤ j ≤ ti. For any fixed j, j ≥ 2, let πx, πy and πz be the
partition after the j−1-th move of agent i, the partition before the j-th move of
agent i, and the partition after the j-th move of agent i, respectively. It is trivial
that x < y < z. We also have i ∈ Bxrj−1 , i ∈ B
z
rj , s(B
z
rj ) = s(B
z−1
m ) + ai and
s(Bxrj−1) = s(B
x−1
m ) + ai. Due to the first part of Lemma 2, we have s(B
z−1
m ) >
s(Bx−1m ) and therefore s(B
z
rj ) > s(B
x
rj−1 ). Due to the second part of Lemma 2,
we have s(Bzrj−1) ≤ s(B
x
rj−1). Therefore, s(B
z
rj ) > s(B
z
rj−1), and so rj < rj−1.
This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2. (a) FNE(I) always exists, and computing an FNE(I) can be done
in O(n2) time;
(b) PoSFNE(I) = 1;
(c) There exists an AFPTAS for approximating the best FNE(I).
Proof. Since m < n, and a rational partition is easy to calculate (say, by FFD),
in O(n) time, (a) is straightforward. (b) and (c) are valid for the same reasons
as in Theorem 1. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3. PoAFNE(I) = PoAFNE(II) = PoAFNE(III) = 0.5.
Proof. The minimal covered property guarantees that none of the three equilibria
has a PoA less than 0.5. To prove that they are all exactly 0.5, we only have to
show that PoAFNE(III) = 0.5, since FNE(III) ⊆ FNE(II) ⊆ FNE(I).
We construct an instance as follows. There are 6n items in total: 2n large
items with a1 = a2 = · · · = a2n = 2n− 2, 4n small ones with a2n+1 = a2n+2 =
· · · a6n = 1, and the volume of the bins is b = 2n. It is easy to check that the
partition that each bin contains either two large items or 2n small ones is an
FNE(III). And the partition each bin contains one large item and two small ones
is an optimal partition. Since (n + 2)/(2n) → 0.5 as n → ∞, we complete the
whole proof. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. For any rational partition π, there exists a π′ ∈ FNE(III), such
that p(π′) ≥ p(π).
Proof. If π is not an FNE(III), then there exists an agent j ∈ N and a subset
Cj of Bi (1 ≤ i ≤ m,Bi 6= Bj,pi) such that b ≤ aj + s(Bi \Cj) < s(Bj,pi). We can
construct a new rational partition π′ ≺ π, without decreasing the social welfare,
in at most five steps as follows.
1. Move item j into Bi;
2. If Cj 6= ∅, move the items in Cj into Bj,pi;
3. If (Bj,pi \ {j} ∪ Cj) is non-minimal covered, take out some subset Dj of
items such that it is minimal covered;
4 .If all the bins are covered, open a new bin with items in Dj , else put the
items in Dj into the unique uncovered bin, which must be Bm;
5. If Bm ∪ Dj is non-minimal covered, take out a subset Ej of items such
that it is minimal covered, and open a new bin with items in Ej .
It is not hard to check that π′ ≺ π and p(π′) ≥ p(π). This completes the
proof. ⊓⊔
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Theorem 4. PoSFNE(II) = PoSFNE(III) = 1.
Proof. Lemma 4 tells us that PoSFNE(III) = 1. Since FNE(III) is stronger than
FNE(II), the theorem is given. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. Computing an arbitrary FNE(II) is NP-hard, and so is computing
an arbitrary FNE(III).
Proof. We prove this by reduction to the partition problem. Given any instance
of the partition problem: e1, e2, · · · , en, we construct an instance of SBC as fol-
lows.
There are n+2 items in total: n small ones a1 = 2e1, a2 = 2e2, · · · , an = 2en,
and 2 large ones an+1 = an+2 =
∑n
j=1 ej + 1, and the volume of the bins is
b =
∑n
j=1 2ej +1. Let π be an FNE(II). It suffices to show that π has a bin that
is exactly covered iff the answer to the partition problem is yes.
The necessity part is trivial. We show the sufficiency part. Let C be a set
of items, and
∑
j∈C ej = (1/2)
∑n
j=1 ej. Since the total size of all the items is
exactly 2b, we know that π has exactly two bins. Suppose that π = {B1, B2},
and B1 is minimal covered. There are two possibilities: case 1. B1 has two large
items; case 2. B1 has one large item and a set of small ones. In case 1, B2 will
be exactly the set of small items, and it is uncovered. Therefore, item n+1 will
be strictly better off if he moves to B2 and pushes out the items in C. This
contradicts the fact that π is an FNE(II). Therefore, this case will not occur.
In case 2, suppose B1 is made up of item n + 1 and a set D of small items.
We claim that B1 is exactly covered, which will complete the whole proof. If not,
we will have B2 is uncovered and
∑
j /∈D ej < (1/2)
∑n
j=1 ej . Then
∑
j∈D ej ≥
(1/2)
∑n
j=1 ej +1. Therefore s(B1) = an+1+
∑
j∈D aj ≥ b+3 > b+2, and item
n + 1 will be strictly better off if it moves to B2 and pushes out all the items
other than item n+2, because an+1 + an+2 = b+2. This is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
6 Strong Nash equilibrium
A partition π = (B1, B2, · · · , Bm) is an SNE iff no group of agents can become
all strictly better off by forming a new bin. That is, there is no subset B ⊆ N
such that s(B) ≥ b and s(B) < s(Bj,pi) for all j ∈ B. It is trivial to see that
SNE is stronger than NE and FNE(III).
For any set of items E and its subset F , if s(F ) = min{s(G) : G ⊆ E, s(G) ≥
b}, we say that F is a minimum subset w.r.t. (E, b). The next lemma characterizes
the SNE.
Lemma 5. Suppose π = (B1, B2, · · · , Bm) is a reasonable partition, Bm is the
unique uncovered bin, and s(B1) ≤ s(B2) ≤ · · · ≤ s(Bm−1). Then π is an SNE
iff Bk is a minimum subset w.r.t. (∪mi=kBi, b) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1.
Proof. (sufficiency) Suppose that π is not an SNE, then there is a subset B ⊆ N
such that s(B) ≥ b and s(B) < s(Bj,pi) for all j ∈ B. Let k0 be the smallest
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index such that B ∩ Bk0 6= ∅, and j0 ∈ B ∩ Bk0 . Then B ⊆ ∪
m
i=k0
Bi. By
hypothesis, s(Bk0) = min{s(G) : G ⊆ ∪
m
i=k0
Bi, s(G) ≥ b}. So s(Bk0) ≤ s(B).
This contradicts s(B) < s(Bk0).
(necessity) Suppose that Bk0 is not a minimum subset w.r.t. (∪
m
i=k0
Bi, b),
1 ≤ k0 ≤ m − 1, that is s(Bk0) > min{s(G) : G ⊆ ∪
m
i=k0
Bi, s(G) ≥ b}. Let
B be a minimum subset w.r.t. (∪mi=k0Bi, b), then b ≤ s(B) < s(Bk0). Since
B ⊆ ∪mi=k0Bi, we know s(Bj,pi) ≥ s(Bk0) > s(B) for all j ∈ B. Therefore,
s(B) < s(Bj,pi) for all j ∈ B. A contradiction with π ∈ SNE. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6. SNE exists, and to compute an arbitrary SNE is weakly NP-hard.
Proof. We only have to show the second part. We prove it by reduction to
the partition problem. Let e1, e2, · · · , en be the input of the partition problem,
and an instance of SBC is constructed simply as aj = ej, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and
b = (1/2)
∑n
j=1 ej . Let π be an SNE of SBC. It is straightforward that π has
two exactly covered bins iff the answer to the partition problem is yes.
To prove that the problem is weakly NP-hard, it suffices to show that a
pseudo-polynomial time algorithm is admitted. This is obvious since the calcu-
lating of s(F ) = min{s(G) : G ⊆ E, s(G) ≥ b} can be done in pseudo-polynomial
time simply by recursively calling the algorithm to the subset sum problem. ⊓⊔
The next two corollaries are both obvious.
Corollary 1. An arbitrary SNE, which is also FNE(III) and FNE(II), can be
computed in O(n
∑n
j=1 ej) time.
Corollary 2. If b is a constant, then all the equilibria discussed in our paper
can be computed in O(n2) time.
Theorem 7. PoASNE = PoSSNE = 0.5.
Proof. For any π = (B1, B2, · · · , Bm) ∈ SNE, where Bm is the unique uncovered
bin, we have s(Bi) < 2b for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, then PoA
SNE ≥ 0.5. It suffices
to show that PoSSNE ≤ 0.5.
For any n, we construct an instance as follows. There are 4n items in total:
2n large items a1 = a2 = · · · = a2n = 2n−1, and 2n small ones a2n+1 = a2n+2 =
· · · = a4n = 2, and b = 2n. Then all SNEs are made up of two small bins, each
of which contains n small items, and n large bins, each of which contains two
large items. And all of them have a social profit of n + 2. However, if we pair
each large item with a small one, we will arrive at a social profit of 2n. Since
(n+ 2)/(2n)→ 0.5 (n→∞), we get the whole theorem. ⊓⊔
7 Modified strong Nash equilibrium
In the definition of FNE(I), further allowing the simultaneous migration of a
group of agents from the same minimal covered bin into the unique uncovered
bin gives the concept of modified strong Nash equilibrium (M-SNE). It is easy
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to see that M-SNE is stronger than FNE(I), but weaker than SNE. The exact
definition is given as follows. Suppose that π = (B1, B2, · · · , Bm) is a reasonable
partition, and Bm is the unique uncovered bin.
Definition 4. π is said to be an M-SNE, iff it is rational, and for any 1 ≤ i ≤
m− 1, there is no subset E ⊆ Bi, such that s(Bi \ E) > s(Bm) and Bm ∪ E is
minimal covered.
Lemma 6. For any rational partition π, there exists an π′ ∈ M − SNE, such
that p(π′) ≥ p(π).
Proof. If π is not an M-SNE, we can construct a partition π′ from π by letting
an unsatisfied group of agents migrating into the unique uncovered bin. It is easy
to see that π′ ≺ π. ⊓⊔
Theorem 8. PoAM-SNE = 0.5, PoSM-SNE = 1.
Proof. Lemma 6 guarantees that PoSM-SNE = 1. PoASNE = 0.5 tells us that
PoAM-SNE ≤ 0.5. Since for each bin B in a rational partition, s(B) < 2b, we
get PoAM-SNE ≥ 0.5. Therefore, PoAM-SNE = 0.5. ⊓⊔
Theorem 9. To compute an arbitrary M-SNE is NP-hard.
Proof. We still prove by reduction to the partition problem. Given any instance
of the partition problem: e1, e2, · · · , en, we construct an instance of SBC as fol-
lows.
There are n+1 items in total: aj = 2ej, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, an+1 =
∑n
j=1 ej−1,
and b =
∑n
j=1 2ej − 1. Let π = (B1, B2) be an M-SNE. Obviously, exactly one
of the two bins is covered. Suppose B1 is covered. We prove that the answer to
the partition problem is yes iff B1 is exactly covered.
The sufficiency part is trivial, so we only have to show the necessity part.
Suppose
∑
j∈C ej = (1/2)
∑n
j=1 ej . There are two possibilities: n+ 1 ∈ B1 and
n+1 /∈ B1. In the latter case, we haveB1 = {1, 2, · · · , n}. So s(B1) =
∑n
j=1 2ej =
b + 1 > b, the items in C will benefit if they move into B2. Therefore this case
will not occur. In the former case, if s(B1) > b, we will have s(B1) ≥ b + 2, so
the items in B1 \ {n+ 1} will benefit if they move into B2, a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Since M-SNE is defined analogously to FNE(I), it should actually be written
as M-SNE(I), and we can also define M-SNE(II) and M-SNE(III), analogously
to FNE(II) and FNE(III), respectively. It is not hard to show that all the results
for M-SNE, i.e. NP-hardness, PoA=0.5 and PoS=1, also hold for M-SNE(II) and
M-SNE(III).
8 Further discussions
In this paper, we discussed the selfish bin covering problem. In order to see how
decentralized decision making affects the social profit, various PoAs and PoSs
are analyzed. We mainly considered six equilibrium concepts, whose relations
are summarized as follows.
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FNE(III)⇒ FNE(II)⇒ FNE(I)
⇑ ⇑
SNE ⇒ M -SNE
⇓
NE
It is easy to show that the above relation graph is complete, i.e., all the other
relations that are not expressed in this graph are false.
It’s not hard to check that if we consider asymptotic PoAs and asymptotic
PoSs, i.e. in the definitions we change inf as lim inf and let OPT (G)→∞, then
all the results remain the same. This can be interpreted as that these measures
are pretty stable with regard to the size of the problems.
We remark that the algorithm FFD-LPT in Section 4 is not a best-response-
dynamic algorithm. An open problem is that starting from any rational partition,
does any best-response-dynamic algorithm, which always converges to an NE,
ends in polynomial time, as we showed for FNE(I)? We know this is impossible for
FNE(II) or FNE(III), as they are both NP-hard to compute. It’s also interesting
to study whether SNE and M-SNE can be arrived at in polynomial number of
migrations.
It’s a pity that we haven’t found the applications of selfish bin covering yet,
but we believe that it deserves study just because of its simplicity. The following
are some interesting directions for further research.
1. To consider and design other payoff allocation rules, e.g. the member-
ship rule, i.e. the payoff of a covered bin is shared equally among its members,
allocation rule proportional to varieties of power indices, etc.;
2. To consider the egalitarian social welfare function, i.e. the social welfare
is determined by the lowest payoff among all the players. The corresponding
combinatorial optimization problem can be easily shown to be strongly NP-hard,
by reduction from the 3-partition problem;
3. To take a hybrid social welfare of the utilitarian rule and the egalitar-
ian rule, either aggregating them into one function using the weighting way, or
discussing them lexicographically, or any other method dealing with bi-criteria
problems;
4. To extend the model to heterogenous bin payoffs, i.e. the payoff gained by
every covered bin is a function of its total size. Notice that this is closely related
to the congestion game with a parallel network;
5. To extend the model to heterogenous bins: variable sized bins, variable
payoff bins. Notice that these models are closely related with the selfish load
balancing, i.e. scheduling games, on uniformly related machines;
6. To extend the model to higher dimensional cases, i.e. items and bins are
characterized by vectors of a fixed dimension;
7. To discuss the ordinal model, i.e. how much a covered bin gains is deter-
mined by its rank among all the covered bins. Notice that externality occurs in
this model;
8. To discuss incompatible agent families, i.e. agents from the same family
can not be packed in the same bin;
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9. To discuss a hybrid model of centralization and decentralization, i.e. each
agent may control more than one items;
10. To discuss online coalition formations, i.e. agents arrive one by one, and
each agent decides either to join an old bin, or to open a new bin, e.g. the
procedure proposed by E. Maskin ([20]).
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